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Smoothing out capital-account cycles and reducing their
vulnerability are desirable policy objectives in developing
countries. This paper evaluates the advantages of a simple,
non-discretionary, preventive (prudential) price-based
incentive that severely penalizes short-term foreign currency
liabilities. In particular, it examines the effectiveness of
controls on capital inflows in Colombia during the 1990s.
The analysis finds evidence supporting the conclusion that
these controls were effective in reducing the overall volume
of net capital inflows and that they helped to improve the
term structure of foreign borrowing. An econometric analysis
suggests that capital flows were directly related to interest
rate differentials, controlling for the additional cost imposed
by unremunerated reserve requirements on foreign
borrowing. Hence, the Colombian system of controls on
foreign borrowing was both an effective macroeconomic
policy that allowed the country to gain a degree of monetary
and exchange-rate control and a useful “liability policy” that
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I
Introduction
It is now widely recognized that developing countries
—and particularly emerging economies— are
extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in international
capital flows. The high economic and social costs
entailed in sudden reversals of these flows, especially
when they lead to financial crises, may easily outweigh
the potential gains offered by increased capital mobility.
As a result, an essential objective of macroeconomic
policy is to reduce the intensity of capital-account cycles
with a view to realizing the benefits of international
financial integration while reducing the macroeconomic
instability and financial vulnerability associated with
these cycles.1
In the 1990s, most emerging economies had to deal
with large capital inflows.2 Policy responses to them,
although diverse,3 reflected the common aim of
mitigating their effects in terms of both appreciation
pressures and excessive reliance on short-term capital
inflows.4 To avoid financial crises in the future, it will
be critical to determine which of the policies applied
during this period proved effective in managing such
capital surges and, in particular, in preventing the
excessive accumulation of risk that in some cases led
to financial crises or outright meltdowns when there
was a sudden interruption of external financing.
The recent literature has emphasized that crisis
prevention strategies should involve the adoption of
countercyclical (i.e., in that phase of the cycle,
contractionary) macroeconomic policies during periods
of capital-account surges and the development of strong
prudential regulations and supervision frameworks for
domestic financial systems. It is also recognized,
however, that while these approaches are both necessary
and desirable, countercyclical macroeconomic policies
may be compromised during boom periods by the
additional capital inflows they induce (e.g., the larger
flows generated by sterilized monetary intervention via
its impact on interest rates). Moreover, it is recognized
that the effects of prudential regulation can be
circumvented through direct borrowing abroad. This
implies that it may be useful to complement such
preventive policies with policy instruments aimed
directly at the source of the macroeconomic and
financial pressures faced by developing countries
during boom periods – i.e., excessive capital inflows.5
In this regard, a policy that has been considered to
be potentially effective involves the application of price-
based controls on capital inflows – i.e., an
unremunerated deposit or reserve requirement on
foreign borrowing.6 In particular, it has been argued
that this type of capital-account regulation could be
useful both as a macroeconomic policy tool and as a
“liability policy” for improving the debt profile of
developing countries.
Viewed as a macroeconomic policy tool, such
regulations aim directly at the source of boom-bust
cycles: unstable capital flows. If they succeed in
reducing total capital inflows, they will provide some
room to “lean against the wind” during periods of
financial euphoria through the adoption of a
contractionary monetary policy and/or reduced
exchange-rate appreciation pressures. If effective, they
will also reduce or eliminate the quasi-fiscal costs
associated with sterilized foreign-exchange
accumulation.
We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions made on a
previous version of this paper by Sylvia Díaz, Charles Engel, Yuichi
Kitamura, Jorge Tovar and Kenneth West.
1
 Gourinchas, Valdés and Landerretche (2001) provide a detailed
account of the different sources of such vulnerability.
2
 For a review of the factors driving these surges in capital flows to
developing countries, see Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1996).
3
 Fiscal austerity measures, accelerated trade liberalization, increased
exchange rate flexibility, sterilized intervention, liberalization of
capital outflows and controls on capital inflows were the main
policies used to deal with surges in capital inflows. A good review
of them can be found in Reinhart and Dunaway (1996).
4
 Indeed, cumulative exchange rate appreciation and, especially,
excessive reliance on short-term foreign liabilities appear to be key
determinants of recent financial crises. See Furman and Stiglitz
(1998) and Rodrik and Velasco (2000).
5
 See Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Williamson and Mahar (1998),
Eichengreen (1999) and Ocampo (2003a and 2003b).
6
 Although “reserve requirement” will be used most of the time, the
term “deposit” (at the central bank) will also be used in this paper as
a synonym.
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Viewed as a liability policy, such regulations
recognize the fact that the market rewards sound external
debt profiles (Rodrik and Velasco, 2000). This reflects
the fact that, during times of uncertainty, the market
responds to gross (rather than merely net) financing
requirements, which means that the rollover of short-
term liabilities is not financially neutral. Under these
circumstances, a maturity profile that leans towards
longer-term obligations will reduce illiquidity risks. This
indicates that measures to improve the maturity structures
of both the private and public sectors’ external and
domestic liabilities should be an essential component of
economic policy management during booms.
Broadly speaking, the existing empirical literature
supports the “liability policy” effects of price-based
controls – i.e., the fact that they discourage short-term
capital inflows and thus improve the maturity profile
of external liabilities. However, the question of whether
these controls reduce net capital inflows and ease
pressures on the exchange rate is still a matter of
controversy. In fact, few empirical studies have
analysed these issues, and the evidence relies mostly
on the Chilean experience.7
This paper will address the issue of the
effectiveness of price-based controls on capital inflows
based on Colombia’s experience in the 1990s. In
particular, it examines whether these controls influenced
the level and composition of financial inflows.
Following this introduction, the rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section II presents an overview
of the Colombian regulatory framework for foreign-
exchange transactions in the 1990s. Section III discusses
the conceptual framework of the analysis. Section IV
presents econometric evidence of the impact of capital
controls on the level and term structure of net private
cash capital flows. This is complemented with an
analysis of the sensitivity of capital flows to interest
rate differentials before and after the capital account
was liberalized in Colombia. A number of
complementary econometric exercises are employed for
this purpose. Finally, some concluding remarks are




Colombia liberalized foreign-exchange transactions in
the early 1990s as part of a broader programme of
structural reforms. The initial stage of this process took
place in 1991, when the foreign-exchange control
system that had prevailed for a quarter of a century was
modified in order to allow financial intermediaries to
manage foreign transactions without being subject to
prior controls by the central bank (Banco de la
República) and to allow firms to use their bank accounts
to manage foreign-exchange revenues and expenditures.
Despite this liberalization, transactions continued to be
highly regulated and, in particular, remained subject to
the requirement that they should be channelled through
financial intermediaries that were legally authorized to
operate in the market. Additionally, the 1991 reform
established a minimum maturity of one year for foreign
loans8 and maintained strict regulations on the final use
of funds from such loans, which had to be used for trade
or investment financing. In February 1992, for the first
time, firms were allowed to contract short-term credits
for use as working capital.
It was not until September 1993 that more
sweeping changes were introduced. During this second
stage of reforms, the system of regulating capital flows
based on their final use was replaced by a system based
on the maturities of foreign-currency obligations.
Additionally, domestic financial intermediaries were
7
 Studies on the effects of reserve requirements in Chile include De
Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000), Edwards (1999 and 1998),
Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (1999 and 1996), Budnevich and Le Fort
(1997) and Valdés and Soto (1998). For a general overview, see
Montiel and Reinhart (1999). 8 Some exceptions were granted for specific commercial credits.
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authorized to lend in foreign currency to domestic firms
and residents regardless of the final use of the credit, to
lend to foreigners in international currencies and to
invest liquid assets abroad. However, all debts
denominated in foreign currency had to be registered
with the central bank, including short-term commercial
credits (which previously had not been subject to this
requirement).
More specifically, the new system required a dollar-
denominated reserve to be deposited in the central bank
for all loans of less than a certain maturity (referred to
here as the minimum maturity), at a pre-specified rate
and for a predetermined holding period. In fact, the
reserve requirement was akin to a tax, as it could be
immediately redeemed at pre-established discount
rates.9 The system underwent major changes in
subsequent years, however, as summarized in table 1.
In September 1993, a dollar denominated one-year
reserve requirement of 47% was established for all loans
with terms below a minimum of 18 months.10 In March
1994, the minimum maturity was set at three years and
three types of dollar reserve requirements were
established 93% for loans with maturities up to one
year, 64% for those with maturities up to two years,
and 50% for those with maturities up to three years. In
August 1994, the minimum maturity was increased to
five years and the maturity of the deposit was matched
with that of the loan. The reserve requirement
corresponded to a complex table, with a ceiling of 140%
for loans maturing in less than 30 days and a floor of
42% for loans maturing in five years. In February 1996,
the minimum maturity was shortened to four years and
a new reserve requirement table was established. In
March of that year, the minimum maturity was
shortened again, to three years, and a flat deposit rate
was established, equivalent to 50% of the loan, with an
18-month maturity.
In January 1997, the government imposed an
explicit (Tobin) tax on all capital flows, in addition to
the reserve requirement. This tax was short-lived,
however, since it was decreed unconstitutional in
March. In response to the Constitutional Court’s ruling,
the economic authorities immediately imposed stricter
reserve requirements on foreign borrowing. The
minimum maturity was raised to five years and the
deposit table was maintained. In May 1997, a simpler
system, similar to the one used in Chile, was introduced.
The new system established a flat reserve requirement
in local currency with an 18-month maturity for all
loans. The principle of minimum maturity was therefore
abandoned and peso-denominated reserve requirements
replaced the dollar-denominated ones. In January and
September 1998, the reserve requirement rate and
holding periods were reduced in response to the
pressures created by the international financial crisis.
The reserve requirement was finally eliminated in May





 Although this was a non-remunerated reserve requirement, this
did not mean that it could not have positive or negative returns. In
fact, such returns could arise owing to changes in the relative value
of the currency in which the deposit was made.
10
 This means that a one-year reserve requirement of US$ 47 had to
be held at the central bank (Banco de la República) for every US$ 100
borrowed abroad.
A simple portfolio framework based on the interest
parity condition will be used to analyse the effects of
regulation of private capital flows.11-12 Accordingly,
under perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign
assets, a risk-neutral investor will choose to hold foreign
or domestic assets based on the uncovered interest rate
differential or arbitrage factor; i.e., the difference
between domestic interest rates and foreign interest
11
 See Frankel (1992) and Schulze (2000) for a discussion of how to
measure capital mobility.
12
 An alternative would be to use an asset-pricing model framework.
However, the problem with using these models to test for the
existence of barriers to international investment is that such tests
typically lack explanatory power. Tests that use market integration
as the null hypothesis cannot econometrically reject the existence
of significant barriers because the estimates are too imprecise. See
Schulze (2000), p. 162.
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rates plus expected devaluation. Formally, this may be
expressed as:
1 + i
[1] A =                              –1
(l + i*) (1 + de)
where i is the domestic interest (deposit) rate, i* is the
equivalent foreign interest rate and de is the expected
devaluation. If A>0, investors will prefer domestic
assets and, consequently, the country will experience
capital inflows. On the other hand, if A<0, investors
will prefer foreign assets, and the country will
experience capital outflows. Lastly, investors will
display no preference for either domestic or foreign
assets if A=0, in which case their portfolio will be in
equilibrium and there will be no capital flows associated
with arbitrage factors.
In the presence of the reserve requirement on
capital inflows, however, the arbitrage factor needs to
be adjusted to take into account the opportunity cost of
such requirements.13 As a result, the interest differential
may be calculated as:
1 + i
[2] A =                –1
l + φ
where φ is the (discounted) total annual cost of the
foreign loan. The precise expression for cost φ can be
derived from the fact that the present value of reserve
requirements per dollar borrowed, C, is:
1 + deθ td
[3] C =  r   1–                             
l + i
where r is the reserve requirement rate per dollar
borrowed abroad and td is the maturity of the deposit.
In adition, for the period when reserve requirements
were dollar-denominated (September-May 1997),
θ equals 1, whereas for the period when they were peso-
denominated (May 1997-May 2000), θ equals 0.
Given equation 3, the future value of reserve
requirements may be calculated as follows:14
[4] Lf = [(1 + i*)(1+ deθ )]tc + C (1 + i)tc
where tc is the maturity of the loan. Therefore, using
equation 4, it is possible to calculate the total annual
cost of the loan, φ :
[5] φ = Lf (1/tc) –1
which is used in equation 2 to calculate the arbitrage
factor. Finally, the tax equivalent of reserve
requirements on foreign borrowing can be calculated
using the following expression:
1 + φ
[6] τ =                             –1
(l + i*) (1 + de)
The tax equivalent of reserve requirements is a
function of three main variables: (i) the deposit rate
(r); (ii) the ratio of the maturity of the loan to the
maturity of the reserve requirement; and (iii) the fact
that, when the reserve requirements were dollar-
denominated (between September 1993 and May 1997),
their opportunity cost was positively related to interest
rates and inversely related to the devaluation rate. This
last effect was exactly opposite to the direct effect of
the devaluation rate on the cost of foreign borrowing,
which allowed the reserve requirement to act as a
(partial) stabilizer on the cost of foreign borrowing.
Indeed, lower borrowing costs due to a slow rate of
devaluation or appreciation of the exchange rate
increased the tax equivalent of the reserve requirement,
while the opposite occurred if borrowing costs increased
because of a faster devaluation rate. This stabilizing
effect was lost after May 1997, however, when the
dollar reserve requirement was replaced with the peso-
denominated scheme.
13
 The framework used in this paper assumes imperfect substitution
of domestic and foreign assets. Theoretically, a country-risk premium
should be included in the analysis. However, there is no consistent
measure of Colombia’s country-risk premiums during the period of
analysis. An implicit assumption is thus that risk premiums are
dependent on the factors that are included in the analysis – i.e., capital
regulations and the dummies that capture the external financial
environment.
14
 Since the maturities of the reserve requirement and the loan may
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FIGURE 1
Colombia: Total cost of foreign borrowing
A. Effects of reserve requirements on the relative cost of foreign borrowing
B. Tax equivalent of reserve requirements
C. Annual devaluation
Source: Calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la República).
Figure 1 shows the calculation of the total cost of
foreign borrowing and the tax equivalent of the reserve
requirement for loans of 6, 12, 18, 24 and 36 months,15
and the annual nominal devaluation rate. These figures
show that regulations made short-term foreign
borrowing very expensive for most of the decade,
especially in the case of 6-month loans. It should be
noted, however, that until early 1997 the high cost of
foreign borrowing was associated with trends in the
tax equivalent of reserve requirements. However, after
the May 1997 regulatory change, the high cost of
foreign borrowing basically reflected strong devaluation
15
 For the purposes of the calculation, i is the 90-day domestic
(passive or deposit) interest rate, i* is the equivalent United States
interest rate and de was calculated using a linear combination of
annualized nominal devaluation in the 12 preceding and 12 following
months, giving equal weights to each observation.
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FIGURE 2
Colombia: Interest rate differentials and private cash capital flows
A. Interest rate differentials
B. Private cash capital flows
Source: Calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la República).
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pressures on the nominal exchange rate associated with
the international financial crises prevailing at the time.
Figure 2 shows basic data on interest rate
differentials, excluding and including the costs of
reserve requirements for 18-month and 36-month loans,
respectively,16 and private capital flows involving cash
transactions or, simply, capital cash flows17 (a three-
month moving average has been included in the figure
to show trends in the data). Panel A shows that major
incentives for capital inflows were present from the
second quarter of 1991 to mid-1992, from the third
quarter of 1993 to the second quarter of 1995, from
early 1996 to the second quarter of 1997 and, lastly, in
the last quarter of 1998 and the first quarter of 1999.
It may be noted that, for 36-month loans, incentives
to borrow declined after March 1994 and disappeared
altogether once the August 1994 regulation was put in
place. In fact, interest rate differentials became negative
and incentives to borrow abroad were non-existent by
mid-1995. The combined effects of these restrictive
regulations and a faster devaluation of the nominal
exchange rate explain the sudden interruption of capital
flows experienced in the third quarter of 1995 (see
section B of figure 2). The more flexible regulations
introduced in early 1996, together with the appreciation
of the nominal exchange rate, prompted a rapid increase
in capital inflows in the second half of 1996. By late
1996, speculative attacks threatened to push the
exchange rate below the floor of the currency band (as
reflected by the peak in capital inflows observed in the
data for December 1996). As discussed in section II,
the government reacted to this capital surge by imposing
an explicit (Tobin) tax in January 1997. The policy
measures that followed in March and May of that year
helped to neutralize capital inflows. Indeed, inflows
remained stable until early 1999, when the Brazilian
crisis triggered rapid capital outflows and generated
strong devaluation pressures.
IV
Determinants of private capital flows
1. A review of the existing literature
A brief review of the existing literature on the
effectiveness of price-based capital controls in Colombia
provides a useful background for the additional
econometric evidence presented below. The first
attempt to study the determinants of capital flows
following the liberalization policies adopted in 1993
was conducted by Cárdenas and Barrera (1997). Those
authors argued that regulation was effective in shifting
the composition of capital inflows towards longer-term
maturities, but ineffective in reducing the volume of
net flows. These arguments are based on three sets of
findings. First, taking monthly data for the period
January 1985 to June 1996, those authors found no
relationship between capital flows and interest rate
differentials when they used the tax equivalent of
reserve requirements for short-term (18-month and 24-
16
 See equation 2.
17
 In Colombian terminology, these refer to flows that affect the
foreign currency balance.
month) loans.18 Second, using dummy variables, they
found signs of speculative behaviour before and after
the regulations were changed. Lastly, they found that
control variables had no permanent effects, as reflected
by the insignificance of the coefficients for dummy
variables covering the whole period for which specific
controls were in place. The only exception was a
dummy variable for the period January 1995-June 1996,
which they interpreted as a “tequila effect”.
As indicated by Villar and Rincón (2003), Cárdenas
and Barrera (1997) found no evidence of a relationship
between capital flows and the tax equivalent of reserve
requirements because they failed to consider the effects
of administrative controls prior to 1993. The effects of
such controls and the regime change introduced in 1993
were analysed by Ocampo and Tovar (1997), employing
monthly data for the period January 1990-December
1996. They concluded that controls on capital inflows
18
 The formula used by Cárdenas and Barrera (1997) to measure the
tax equivalent of reserve requirements is different from the one
discussed in the previous section and is inaccurate.
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were effective in altering not only their term structure,
but also the volume of net capital inflows. Unlike
Cárdenas and Barrera (1997), they found evidence of
interest arbitrage when they included the tax equivalent
of reserve requirements for short-term loans (18 and
36 months). Furthermore, tests for the temporary effects
of the different regulations, as reflected by dummy
variables, suggested that external debt stock
adjustments occurred after the February 1992 and
September 1993 liberalization measures. They found
evidence, too, of strong speculative behaviour prior to
the August 1994 regulation (see the following section
for an explanation), but also of a considerable though
delayed effect of this policy change, which reduced
capital inflows by a larger amount than the increases
induced by the previous speculation. This result
provides an alternative to Cárdenas and Barrera’s
“tequila effect” interpretation – i.e., that the capital
controls introduced in August 1994 were effective, but
with a lag. This interpretation seems reasonable, since
spreads on sovereign bonds suggest that the Mexican
crisis had only minor effects in Colombia. Also,
aggregate net flows to Latin America suggest that
contagion was significant only in the first quarter of
1995.19
In another paper, Rincón (1999) constructed an
alternative measure of short-term monthly private
capital flows to evaluate the effectiveness of capital
controls.20 His results, based on cointegration analysis,
provided evidence of the effectiveness of capital
controls on financial inflows. In particular, he found a
significant negative statistical relationship between the
tax equivalent of reserve requirements, as measured by
Ocampo and Tovar (1997), and capital flows. However,
he did not control for stock adjustments associated with
changes in regulations, which is a central issue of the
debate on the effectiveness of capital controls (Cárdenas
and Barrera, 1997; Ocampo and Tovar, 1997).
Cárdenas and Steiner (2000) analysed the
determinants of private capital flows using quarterly
data for the period 1987-1997. Their study used
alternative measures of capital flows, which included,
apart from the central bank’s foreign exchange balance,
estimates of capital flows filtered through non-factor
service transactions.21 These measures were then used
in two regressions of the determinants of capital flows.
In the first, capital flows were regressed against a proxy
for the external environment faced by the region (as
reflected in the funds raised in international markets
by Latin American countries). In the second, regressions
were run against effective interest rate differentials,
including the cost of reserve requirements under
alternative maturities.22 Their findings suggested that
capital flows were highly sensitive to the external
environment, as well as to interest rate differentials,
including the cost of reserve requirements. While they
suggested that these results “should be interpreted as
indirect evidence that Tobin taxes in Colombia not only
affect the term structure of private capital inflows but
also diminish their absolute amount”, Cárdenas and
Steiner (2000) hastened to point out that alternative
exercises do not support this view.
In one of these alternative exercises, Cárdenas and
Steiner ran OLS regressions for capital flows while
controlling for interest rate differentials, excluding the
cost of reserve requirements and the external
environment variable. The effects of price-based capital
account regulations were captured in this exercise by a
dummy variable for the post-March 1993 period in
which those regulations were in place. The results of
this exercise indicated that capital flows were positively
and significantly related to interest rate differentials and
that they depended little on external factors, whether
or not the post-March 1993 dummy was included. The
effect of the dummy variable was significant in only
one case, and in some cases the sign was positive,
leading the authors to conclude “[…] that if Tobin taxes
19
 Cárdenas and Barrera (1997) and Ocampo and Tovar (1997) also
examined whether interest rate arbitrage filtered through the service
and trade accounts. The first study found evidence of filtering through
the service account but not through the trade account; the second
found no evidence of filtering in either case.
20
 This study uses monthly series constructed from quarterly balance-
of-payments data, rather than the cash flow accounts of the central
bank’s foreign exchange balance, on which all the other studies are
based. The major difference between the two is that they take
different approaches to trade financing (see footnote 23 below). It
should be pointed out that one disadvantage of balance-of-payments
accounts is that they are only available on a quarterly basis, whereas
figures 1 and 2 of the present paper indicate that monthly capital
flows are highly volatile. This shows that the data-generating process
cannot be adequately captured using quarterly data.
21
 Three measures of private capital flows were used in this paper.
The simplest was the capital account balance of the central bank’s
foreign exchange balance. The other two add, respectively, the
“transitory” component of the private balance of non-factor services
and the total balance of non-factor services.
22
 Maturities of 18, 24, 36 and 60 months were used.
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did in fact induce a decline in short-term foreign
borrowing, they fostered an increase in overall foreign
borrowing”, indicating, furthermore, that “[t]his last
point most probably has to do with the fact that while
the Tobin taxes by definition reduce the interest rate
differential […] they might enhance the relative
attractiveness of the country as a whole”. However, this
explanation suggests that the authors might be
misinterpreting what the dummy is capturing. Indeed,
if the attractiveness of the country is driving the result,
the dummy is probably capturing something else, such
as the “pull factors” associated with structural
reforms.23
Lastly, Villar and Rincón (2003) examined the
effectiveness of capital controls from a different
perspective. Their main concern was whether reserve
requirements help authorities in open economies to
manage the trade-off they face by enabling them, in
particular, to avoid an excessive appreciation of the
domestic currency while keeping control of domestic
interest rates in order to discourage excess spending in
the economy. In order to answer this question, they
estimated reduced form equations for the period 1993-
1999. These equations were derived from a partial
equilibrium model aimed at analysing the joint
determination of real interest rates and real exchange
rates. Their model relied on three equations: one for
the short-run determinants of the real interest rate, one
for the long-run dynamics of the real exchange rate and
one for the behaviour of capital flows.24
Their econometric estimates and simulations
indicated that price-based controls on capital inflows
had a positive effect on domestic ex-ante real interest
rates and, therefore, that controls were effective in
increasing “[…] domestic real interest rates in a context
of an open economy with a low degree of monetary
autonomy”. They also found that the controls produced
this effect without creating pressure for a real
appreciation of the peso.
2. Econometric framework
As discussed in the preceding sections, the uncovered
interest rate differential approach provides a suitable
framework for studying the effects of Colombia’s
regulation of capital flows. Indeed, using monthly data
for the period January 1990-December 1999, it is
possible to estimate an equation in which private capital
flows, as measured by the central bank’s foreign
exchange balance,25 are a function of interest rate
differentials and other variables. In other words, it can
be assumed that there is a portfolio allocation problem
that yields a (linear) solution of the following type:
[7] Kf = Kf (g, A, δi , φi)
  +  +       – 
where g is assumed to be an economic activity variable,
proxied by imports of capital goods; A is the interest
rate differential arbitrage factor, including the effects
of reserve requirements on foreign borrowing, as
defined by equation 2 and graphed in figure 2; δi
represents the dummy used to control for the effect on
total volume of the different regulations enforced during
the period of analysis;26 and φi represents the dummies
23
 Explanations for capital flows to developing countries have
focused on two main factors: “push” and “pull” factors. The first
are factors that operate by reducing the attractiveness of capital flows
to industrialized countries. The second are factors that attract capital
as a result of improvements in the risk/return characteristics of assets
issued by developing countries. Lastly, a third factor could be
associated with a change in the degree of financial integration due
to regulatory changes (see Agénor and Montiel, 1999).
24
 The interest rate is determined by expected real devaluation, the
tax equivalent of reserve requirements and the international ex-ante
interest rate. Short-run deviations from the long-run parity condition
are presumed to be associated with excess domestic money supply.
The exchange rate is determined, by long-run real factors, such as
the terms of trade, government expenditure, real capital flows and a
trend capturing productivity and technological changes. Lastly,
capital flows are modelled as a function of the interest rate
differentials, including the tax equivalent of reserve requirements.
25
 This measure of cash capital flows differs from normal balance-
of-payments accounts in that exports and imports are registered at
the time when they are actually paid for, which is when they actually
generate a cash flow. Accordingly, trade financing is excluded from
the capital account and is treated as a determinant of the current
account of the foreign exchange balance. In any case, it is correct to
exclude trade financing from the current exercise, since the
regulations pertaining to it were different and were only partly subject
to reserve requirements. Also, Ocampo and Tovar (1997) found no
evidence of interest rate arbitrage in trade financing.
26
 Other variables used in the literature include credit ratings or
measures of excess expenditure to capture determinants of current
account deficits. Although it may be desirable to control for these,
the way such series have been constructed makes them unsuitable.
Indeed, authors such as De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) or
Rincón (1999) have constructed monthly series from annual or
quarterly series, which can easily result in biased estimates.
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used to control for temporary changes in the supply of
capital flows associated with the tequila, Asian, Russian
and Brazilian crises.27
The signs in equation 7 show the expected
relationship between private capital flows and each of
the explanatory variables. However, the interpretation
of the dummies for capital controls depends on whether
the regulations liberalized the capital account (i.e., in
February 1992, September 1993, February-March
1996, March 1997 and January and September 1998)
or tightened the controls (i.e., in March and August
1994, January 1997 and May 1997; see table 1).28 A
positive coefficient is expected in the first case, and
should be interpreted as an adjustment in stocks of debt
induced by liberalization. Meanwhile, a negative
coefficient is expected in the latter case, reflecting the
discrete effect of controls on capital inflows that
generate effects beyond those captured in the interest
rate differential (A).
The interpretation of the dummies used for the
period August 1994-January 1996 warrants special
attention. In the weeks preceding the adoption of tighter
measures in August 1994, the central bank received
registrations for significant amounts of debt (which
were subject to the reserve requirements decreed in
March 1994), as agents expected that the new President,
who took office in early August, would propose more
stringent regulations to the central bank, which were
likely to be accepted. Without a doubt, these early
registrations reduced the effectiveness of controls for
some months after the new restrictions were introduced.
In order to reflect this speculative attack and to measure
the effectiveness of controls during this period, two
dummies were used. The first, for September-December
1994, was meant to capture the speculative attack
against controls, and should thus have a positive sign,
while a dummy for January 1995-January 1996 captured
the delayed effect of controls, and should have a
negative sign.
Equation 7 captures the effect of the new
regulations through two different channels. First,
through the additional cost of foreign borrowing, which
affects capital flows through the arbitrage factor and
second, through the discrete effects of regulations
estimated using the dummy variables. The latter effect
may be interpreted as evidence of imperfect substitution
between loans of different maturities due to risk factors
on the supply side that affect their relative availability.
3. Cointegration analysis
In order to estimate equation 7, the series Kf, g and A
were tested for the order of integration. Following
the approach used by Cárdenas and Barrera (1997)
and Ocampo and Tovar (1997), two alternative
measures for the interest arbitrage factor were used;
one is constructed using the cost of reserve
requirements for 18-month loans, while the other uses
36-month loans (see figure 2). Augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests for the presence of unit roots are reported
in table 2. As shown, it was not possible to reject the
null hypothesis of the presence of unit roots for any
of the four series.
Owing to the existence of unit roots in the data
and in order to avoid spurious regressions, the
econometric estimates were performed using a
multivariate framework.29 More specifically,
Johansen’s maximum likelihood cointegration analysis
framework was employed to estimate the linear
relationship described by equation 7. In particular, the
relationship estimated is:
[8] ∆zt = Γ1∆zt–1 + Πzt–1 + µ + ΨDt + εt
where, ∏ = αβ’ provided that α and β are (3x1) matrices
that measure the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium
and the long-run coefficients or cointegration
relationship, respectively. Meanwhile, zt is a (3x1)
vector formed by the variables Kf, A and g, and Dt is a
vector formed by the intervention dummies δi and φi
that control for changes in regulations on foreign
borrowing and for supply shocks associated with the
27
 The dummies included were: tequila (January 1995-March 1995),
Asia (November 1997-December 1997), Russia (August 1998-
November 1998) and Brazil (January 1999-May 1999). Additionally,
an overall dummy for November 1997-November 1999 was
included, as it is assumed that some financial flows turned away
from emerging economies after the Asian crisis. Only the dummies
that were statistically significant are reported.
28
 A dummy variable was also included to capture the extraordinary
inflows of December 1996, which were partly associated with
privatization processes.
29
 Indeed, it is well known that a linear combination of non-stationary
variables may be stationary and therefore cointegrated. As suggested
in the literature, the correct way to proceed is to use a multivariate
analysis and test for the presence of cointegration vectors.
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TABLE 2
Colombia: Augmented dickey-fuller tests of unit rootsa
T-STATISTIC
T-tao 3 T-mu 1 T
Lag Coef- Critical Coef- Critical Coef- Critical Coef- Critical Coef- Critical
VARIABLE length ficient value ficient value ficient value ficient value ficient value
Cash capital flowsb 3 -2.24 -3.45 2.72 6.49 -2.32 -2.89 2.71 4.71 -1.89 -1.95
Diff [Cash capital flows] 2 -10.35 -3.45
Interest rate differentials
36-month credits (A36)b 6 -3.08 -3.45 5.32 6.49 -1.79 -2.89 1.68 4.71 -1.64 -1.95
Diff [ A36 ] 3 -4.84 -3.45
18-month credits (A18)b 6 -2.75 -3.45 4.06 6.49 -1.64 -2.89 1.42 4.71 -1.69 -1.95
Diff [ A18 ] 3 -4.84 -3.45
Imports of capital goodsb 2 -1.40 -3.45 1.16 6.49 -0.92 -2.89 -1.38 4.71 0.04 -1.95
Diff [ Imports of
capital goods] 1 -11.66 -3.45
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a Indicates that the null hypothesis of presence of unit root cannot be rejected.
b Diff [...] denotes first difference of the variable.
Critical values from Dickey and Fuller (1981), as reproduced in Harris (1995), for a sample size of T=100 and 5% significance level.
Lag lengths for the test were chosen using the BIC information criterion.
international financial environment, respectively.30
Lastly, εt ~ niid(O,Σ).31
The results are summarized in tables 3 and 4. Table
3 reports the λ-trace and λ-max tests for the reduced
rank hypothesis in the full VAR model.32 The first three
equations in this table make use of interest rate
differentials, including the cost of reserve requirements
for 36-month loans, while the remaining equations (4
to 6) use the cost of reserve requirements for 18-month
loans. According to these tests, one cointegration
relationship was found between private capital flows
(Kf ), interest rate differentials (A) and imports of capital
goods (g) in each of the different equations estimated.
For interpretation purposes, the cointegration vector or
long-run relationship is normalized by the coefficient
associated with capital flows, so that the relevant
equation for capital flows becomes:
[9] ∆Kft = Γ11∆Kft–1 + Γ12∆At–1 + Γ13∆gt–1
β2                      β3     
+α∼ 1  Kft–1 +             At–1 +          gt–1    +  Ψ11Dt + εtβ1                       β1   
 
where α∼ 1=α1β1 measures the average speed of
adjustment to long-run equilibrium (see appendix for
more details).
Estimates for equation 9 are reported in table 4,
columns 1, 2, 4 and 5. At first glance, the estimates
suggest a strong and statistically significant relationship
between cash capital flows and interest rate
differentials;33 however, this will be analysed in more
detail later. Also, the parameters of the error correction
mechanism term, α∼ 1, indicate that disequilibria in the
30
 It may appear to some readers that many dummies imply
uncertainty about the specification of the model. However, this is
not a universally shared view and is probably not shared by British
econometricians such as David Hendry. We thank Ken West for
pointing this out.
31
 See appendix for a more detailed derivation of the system
estimated.
32
 The lag lengths for the unrestricted VAR models were all chosen
using the BIC information criterion. Moreover, as shown in the
appendix, the VECM estimates use this number of lags minus one.
33
 The effects are also as expected– i.e., increases in both the activity
variable and the interest rate differential tend to increase capital
flows. Nonetheless, because of the way long-run cointegration
relations are usually specified (i.e., in vector notation), the signs
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long-run relationship are rapidly and exclusively
adjusted by cash capital flows. In fact, the numerical
and statistical insignificance of the coefficients
associated with interest rate differentials and imports
of capital goods in the error correction mechanism in
the first five equations in table 4 suggests that these
two variables could be treated as weakly exogenous to
the system. With this in mind, a likelihood ratio test on
the loadings for these variables was performed.34 Also,
a complementary likelihood ratio test for the exclusion
of interest rate differentials and imports of capital goods
from the cointegration vector was performed. The
results of both tests are reported in the lower part of
table 4. The first test confirms the initial view that it is
necessary to estimate a conditioned model for capital
TABLE 3
Colombia: Rank test for cointegration vectorsa
Eigen value L-max Critical value L-trace Critical value Ho:
b c
Equation 1 0.4194 64.2 21.0d 77.2 29.7d r = 0 p-r = 3
0.0635 7.8 14.1 13.0 15.4 r = 1 p-r = 2
0.0434 5.2 3.8 5.2 3.8 r = 2 p-r = 1
Equation 2 0.4145 63.2 21.0d 72.8 29.7d r = 0 p-r = 3
0.0636 7.8 14.1 9.6 15.4 r = 1 p-r = 2
0.0159 1.9 3.8 1.9 3.8 r = 2 p-r = 1
Equation 3e 0.4105 62.4 21.0d 62.4 29.7d r = 0 p-r = 1
Equation 4 0.4072 61.7 21.0d 74.3 29.7d r = 0 p-r = 3
0.0754 9.3 14.1 12.6 15.4 r = 1 p-r = 2
0.0279 3.3 3.8 3.3 3.8 r = 2 p-r = 1
Equation 5 0.3990 60.1 21.0d 70.9 29.7d r = 0 p-r = 3
0.0783 9.6 14.1 10.8 15.4 r = 1 p-r = 2
0.0102 1.2 3.8 1.2 3.8 r = 2 p-r = 1
Equation 6e 0.3969 59.7 21.0d 59.7 29.7d r = 0 p-r = 1
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a Cointegration vectors are presented in table 4. Critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992) as reproduced in Harris (1995). Lags in all
Var-models: 2. Number of observations: 116.
b Number of cointegration vectors.
c Number of unit roots in the system.
d Indicates rejection of null hypothesis at 5% statistical significance level.
e Equation conditioned by weak exogeneity. See table 4 for more details.
inflows – i.e., that interest rate differentials and imports
of capital goods should be modeled as weakly
exogenous variables. However, the second test indicates
that these variables cannot be excluded from the
cointegration vector.35
Given these results, the new system conditioned
by weak exogeneity becomes:







β2                      β3     
+α∼ 1  Kft–1 +             At–1 +         gt–1     +  Ψ11Dt + εtβ1                       β1   
 
34
 See appendix for further details regarding this test.
35
 A joint test for both restrictions on the cointegration vector and
weak exogeneity is also reported in table 4. As indicated, the null
hypothesis for joint restrictions was rejected.
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The estimates for the conditioned models using the
two alternative measures for the interest rate
differentials are reported as equations 3 and 6 in table 4.
According to these equations, over 70% of the long-
run disequilibrium is adjusted with a one-month lag,
indicating that regulations on capital inflows, which
alter the long-run equilibrium by inducing changes in
interest rate differentials, will have a rapid effect on
the dynamics of cash capital flows. These results also
indicate that interest rate differentials Granger-cause
capital flows. Therefore, more restrictive regulations
will trigger a strong and immediate contraction of
capital inflows. This indicates, in turn, that price-based
controls on capital inflows rapidly reduce pressures on
fundamental macroeconomic variables.
In addition to the estimates, a test for the constancy
of the long-run parameters was performed. The plot of
the test for the constancy of the cointegration space
between September 1993 and December 1999 is
reported in figure 3. According to the test, which was
scaled by the 95% quantile in the χ2-distribution so that
unity corresponds to a test with a 5% significance level,
it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis of
parameter constancy for the period investigated for
either equation 3 or equation 6 in table 4 (see appendix).
In this regard, an important related question is whether
the sensitivity of cash capital flows to interest rate
differentials increased following the September 1993
liberalization. In fact, Ocampo and Tovar (1997) found
evidence pointing in this direction. However, for the
sake of exposition, we will return to this issue in a later
section. For now, it is enough to note that despite the
possibility of a structural change in the long-run
relationship, the test for parameter constancy indicates
that that relationship was statistically stable in the post-
September 1993 period.
The estimated effects of interest rate differentials
on capital flows and the net effect attributable to reserve
requirements are reported in table 5. Using the long-
run coefficient for interest rate differentials associated
with 36-month loans (equation 3), it is shown that
capital inflows would have been significantly higher
in the absence of controls. The effect of controls was
particularly marked between April and August 1994
(capital flows were reduced on average by US$ 73
million per month), between September 1994 and
January 1996 (US$ 102 million per month) and from
January to March 1997 (US$ 70 million per month).
As shown by the error correction mechanism
estimates, the price effect of controls on the volume of
financial flows will tend to disappear quite rapidly.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine other channels
through which controls may affect the volume of capital
inflows. The exogenous dummies in table 4 capture the
discrete effects of policy changes in regulations. The
results show that stock adjustments appear to have
followed the February 1992 and September 1993
liberalization reforms, but the findings in this regard
were not conclusive (see equations 1 and 4 in table 4).
The estimates also suggest that there was
speculative behaviour prior to the shift to a tighter policy
stance in August 1994, which had the undesirable effect
of increasing capital inflows over the following four
months (by an average of more than US$ 98 million
per month). In any case, this policy change had a
delayed effect, as reflected by the reduction of capital
inflows by over US$ 101 million per month between
January 1995 and January 1996. Therefore, the net
discrete effect of these particular regulations was a
reduction of capital inflows by over US$ 921 million
over the 17 months it was in place; i.e., between August
1994 and January 1996. Furthermore, if the discrete
effects of the August 1994 change are added to those
induced by the higher cost of foreign borrowing (as
calculated in table 5), then the net effect of reserve
requirements was far from negligible: US$ 2.2 billion
for the whole period for which this regulation was in
place – a reduction equivalent to 27% of the
international reserves held at the central bank in
December 1995.
Other regulations that had some discrete effects
were those introduced in January 1997, when the
explicit Tobin tax was put in place, and in May 1997.
However, these effects are statistically insignificant.
The estimates also controlled for discrete changes
associated with international financial crises.36
Interestingly, a dummy for the period November 1997-
December 1999 as a whole, which controls for the
supply effect associated with the international financial
disturbances, is statistically significant and has non-
negligible effects. Indeed, estimates suggest that, on
average, monthly capital inflows fell by US$ 38 million.
Estimates also show an adverse and significant
“neighbourhood” effect associated with the Brazilian
crisis, which reduced monthly cash capital inflows by more
than US$ 55 million between January and May 1999.
36
 An attempt was made to use Latin bond indexes to capture the
international financial environment, but no satisfactory results were
obtained.
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FIGURE 3
Colombia: Test for constancy of the cointegration space
A. For cointegration equation estimates using 36-month credits
(equation 3 in table 4)
A. For cointegration equation estimates using 18-month creditsa
(equation 6 in table 4)
Source: Calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la República).
a Test statistic has been scaled by the 95% quantile in the chi-sq. distribution so that unity corresponds to a test with 5% significance level.
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TABLE 5
Colombia: Estimated effects of interest rate differentials
on cash capital flows
(Monthly averages)
Estimated cash capital flows Estimated cash capital flows
Interest rate differentials using the estimated cointegration vectora using the Kalman filter estimates
(percentages) (Millions of United States dollars) (Millions of United States dollars)
Excluding Including Net Excluding Including Net Excluding Including Net
reserve reserve effect reserve reserve effect reserve reserve effect
require- require- require- require- require- require- require- require- require-
ments ments ments ments ments ments ments ments ments
January 1990 - February 1992 7.3 46.5 4.5
March 1992 - September 1993 9.3 59.4 24.9
October 1993 - March 1994 13.7 9.8 3.9 87.9 62.7 25.1 53.2 37.8 15.4
April 1994 - August 1994 18.6 7.3 11.3 119.2 46.7 72.5 76.0 22.4 53.6
September 1994 - January 1996 15.2 -0.8 16.0 97.5 -4.8 102.3 63.7 -5.7 69.4
February 1996 - December 1996 15.5 6.4 9.2 99.6 40.7 58.9 98.5 43.9 54.6
January 1997 - March 1997 14.4 3.5 10.9 92.2 22.6 69.6 124.5 30.2 94.3
April 1997 - May 1997 11.0 4.2 6.8 70.5 27.0 43.5 91.9 35.9 56.0
June 1997 - December 1997 -1.3 -6.0 4.7 -8.3 -38.2 29.9 -7.9 -52.2 44.3
January 1998 - September 1998 4.3 -0.4 4.7 27.8 -2.2 30.0 27.4 -3.0 30.4
November 1998 - December 1999 -1.1 -3.7 2.7 -6.9 -24.0 17.1 -8.0 -33.7 25.7
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a Estimates based on equation 3 of table 4.
Therefore, since late 1997 net capital inflows to the
Colombian economy were reduced by nearly US$ 807
million as a result of international contagion.
4. Temporary and discrete effects of interest rate
differentials
As an alternative exercise to estimate the effects of
capital flow controls, a Kalman filter was applied to
equation 7. Figure 4 graphically displays the temporary
and discrete effects of interest rate differentials on
capital flows for 36-month loans (panel A). The former
are associated with changes in interest rate differentials
due to variations in the cost of reserve requirements,
while the latter are associated with adjustments in the
volume of capital flows. As shown, regulations were
effective in reducing capital inflows when they were
tightened, particularly in August 1994, January 1997
and May 1997. In turn, capital flows increased when
regulations were loosened in February 1996 and January
1998. As shown in panel B of figure 4, which compares
the estimated effects of interest rate differentials
including and excluding the cost of reserve
requirements, the effect of interest rate differentials on
capital flows is mainly attributable to capital controls,
since the difference between the two series is mainly
attributable to the cost of reserve requirements.
Furthermore, the estimated effects of interest rate
differentials using the Kalman filter methodology
follow a dynamic parallel to the one estimated using
the Johansen cointegration framework (see table 5).
However, it is worth mentioning that prior to January
1997 the net effects of reserve requirements appear
weaker with the Kalman filter than with the
cointegration methodology and slightly stronger after
that date.
These results indicate that controls on capital flows
were effective in reducing the volume of these inflows,
owing both to the increased cost of shorter-term
borrowing and to the discrete effects of the regulations,
associated with the imperfect substitution of borrowing
at different maturities. In particular, the strict controls
imposed in August 1994 (with a lag related to the
speculative behaviour observed before the regulations
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FIGURE 4
Colombia: Estimated effects of price-based capital controls on cash capital flows
B. Overall effects of interest rate differentials
(excluding and including costs of reserve requirements)
A. Temporary and discrete effects of interest rate differentials
(including costs of forced deposits)
Source: Calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la República).
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were introduced) and the January and May 1997
restrictions had the desired effects. The results also
indicate that temporary adjustments in the volume of
net capital flows may have taken place following the
February 1992 and September 1993 liberalization
measures.
5. Testing for structural change
An important issue regarding price-based capital
controls is that they are designed for countries that
choose to be integrated in international capital markets.
Therefore, whether the transition from old-style
exchange controls to price-based capital account
regulations effectively liberated of the capital account
constitutes a central question to be addressed. Or, to
put it differently, an effective liberalization should
reflect an increased sensitivity of cash capital flows to
interest arbitrage incentives. Table 6 presents the results
of a simple OLS regression analysis37 conducted to
capture the change in the sensitivity of cash capital
flows to interest arbitrage following the September 1993
reform of the capital account regime. The main
difference between this exercise and the cointegration
procedure reported above is that although both measures
of interest rate differentials are interacted with two
dummy variables, one of them captures the pre-
liberalization period (January 1990-September 1993)
and the other, the post-liberalization period (October
1993-December 1999).
Table 6 reports six different regressions. The main
differences between them lie in the interest rate
differentials used; i.e., 18-month or 36-month credits.
Furthermore, in each case three different exercises are
reported. Equations 1 and 2 report simple regressions
without controlling for changes in the volume of net
capital flows associated with policy shifts or with the
international environment after the financial crises. The
remaining equations report different specifications that
do control for these factors. In addition, for each
regression a Chow test for structural change in the
sensitivity of capital flows to interest rate differentials
is reported.
The results show a significant increase in the
sensitivity of cash capital flows to interest rate arbitrage
following the September 1993 reform, indicating that
this reform effectively liberalized the capital account
regime. The different specifications used illustrate the
robustness of this conclusion. Indeed, the Chow test
for structural change indicates that the null hypothesis
of equal sensitivity of cash capital flows to interest rate
differentials before and after the 1993 liberalization
reforms are rejected under all specifications.
Furthermore, the results show that, whereas capital
flows were highly sensitive to interest rate differentials
after September 1993, such an interest arbitrage effect
is not statistically robust for the pre-liberalization
period, as reflected in the implicit t-statistics of the
estimated coefficients.
6. Term structure of external debt
The econometric results presented above show that
capital controls had a significant impact on the volume
of net capital inflows. An additional issue in evaluating
their effectiveness is whether they have induced a more
favourable term structure in Colombia’s foreign debt.
This is of particular interest because, as we have seen,
the literature on financial crises has pointed out that
excessive reliance on short-term debt increases a
country’s vulnerability and exposure to such crises. Based
on annual data, panel A of figure 5 presents the term
structure of private foreign debt. As shown, the share of
short-term debt out of total private debt fell significantly
in Colombia during the 1990s. Indeed, this share, which
had represented over 60% of foreign private debt at the
beginning of the 1990s, had fallen to less than 20% by
the end of the decade. This drastic reduction was achieved
between 1994 and 1998, which coincides with the
intensive use of price-based controls on capital flows.
Moreover, the stability of the share of short-term debt
after 1997 suggests that the May 1997 regulation, which
introduced peso-denominated reserve requirements on
foreign debt for all loan maturities, did not constitute a
perfect substitute for the previous system of controls
based on dollar-denominated reserve requirements on
foreign loans under a minimum maturity. This finding is
supported by the evidence presented below.
Figure 5, panel B presents additional evidence
on how reserve requirements have affected the term
structure of external debt, based on monthly averages
of central bank registrations of foreign-currency loans
extended by financial institutions.38 The figure shows
37
 Owing to the cointegrated nature of the series involved, the
spurious regression risk is eliminated.
38
 It is important to take into account that 0- to 18-month loans are
basically associated with import and export financing, which has
been exempt from reserve requirements since March 1996.
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Source: Calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la República).
B. External debt registrations with foreign financial institutions according to loan maturities (% share in total)
FIGURE 5
Colombia: Term structure of external private debt
A. External private debt balance
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that the regulations implemented in March and August
1994 had a major impact on the term structure of
foreign borrowing, as foreign debt registrations
shifted towards a longer-term maturity structure. It
is also evident that the liberalization policies of early
1996 shifted the term structure towards shorter
maturities, while the tighter policies of January 1997
and March 1997 had the opposite effect. Lastly, the
May 1997 regulations had an intermediate effect in
this regard.
39
 A number of studies on Chile and that of Cárdenas and Barrera
(1997) on Colombia argue that controls on capital flows have been
effective in altering the term structure of foreign debt but not the
overall volume of capital inflows. This interpretation seems




This paper has explored the effectiveness of price-based
controls on capital inflows in Colombia in the 1990s.
The effects of these controls are channeled through two
different mechanisms. One is the interest rate
differential, which reflects the higher cost of foreign
borrowing. The other is associated with the discrete
effects of changes in the regulatory system, which may
be basically associated with the imperfect substitution
between long-term and short-term borrowing.39
The econometric results support the conclusion that
capital inflows are sensitive to interest rate differentials
and, therefore, that price-based regulations on capital
inflows effectively reduced the volume of capital
inflows in Colombia. Also, the evidence presented
indicates that these regulations improved the term
structure of Colombia’s external borrowing. The results
also confirm that the September 1993 change in the
capital account regime effectively liberalized the capital
account by increasing the sensitivity of capital flows
to interest arbitrage incentives.
The econometric evidence also indicates that
reserve requirements did not have the same outcomes
once the dollar-denominated requirements on loans
under a certain minimum maturity were replaced, in
May 1997, with a flat peso-denominated rate unrelated
to the maturity of the loan. This suggests that the latter
system was not a perfect substitute for previous
regulations. In particular, the pre-May 1997 system had
stronger effects on the term structure of external
borrowing. Also, the dollar-denominated system
produced an interesting stabilizing effect on the cost of
foreign borrowing in the face of nominal exchange rate
fluctuations, whereas this effect was lost in the peso-
denominated system.
Overall, the analysis suggests that price-based
capital controls effectively play a dual policy role when
a country experiences capital surges. On the one hand,
they allow authorities to gain monetary and exchange
rate control when under stronger pressure from capital
inflows. This effect has also been confirmed in parallel
research by Villar and Rincón (2003), using a different
methodology. On the other hand, price-based
regulations also constitute an effective “liability policy”
that improves the term structure of external liabilities,
thereby reducing liquidity risks.
This dual effect makes capital controls a desirable
policy tool for reducing a country’s vulnerability to
sudden reversals of capital inflows. Their usefulness is
enhanced by the fact that they are easily implemented,
non-discretionary and preventive (prudential) in nature,
since they penalize short-term foreign-currency
liabilities more heavily.40
Lastly, it should be recalled that price-based capital
controls, though effective in reducing capital inflows
and improving the debt profile, are not a substitute for
sound macroeconomic policies or for policies aimed at
improving the prudential regulation and supervision of
domestic financial systems.
40
 Ocampo (2003a) compares these price-based controls to
quantitative controls such as those employed in Malaysia during
the Asian crisis.
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APPENDIX
Following Hansen and Juselius (1995), suppose the following
p-dimensional vector autoregressive model of the type:
[A.1] zt = A1zt–1 + ... + Akzt–k + µ + ΨDt + εt   t = 1,…,T.
where zt is a px1 vector of stochastic variables, zt-k+1,…,z0
are fixed, ε1,…,ε t are niid (0,Σ) and Dt is a vector of
nonstochastic variables, such as intervention dummy
variables.
This unrestricted vector autoregression model (VAR)
involving k-lags of zt may be transformed into a vector error
correction model (VECM):
[A.2] ∆zt = Γ1∆zt–1 + ... + Γk–1∆zt–k+1 + Πzt–k + µ + ΨDt + εt
εt~niid (O,Σ)
The hypothesis of cointegration in equation A.2 can be
formulated as a reduced rank test of the Π-matrix:
H
o
 (r): Π = αβ’
where α and β are pxr matrices of full rank and r indicates
the number of cointegration vectors. Furthermore, the
hypothesis H
o
(r) implies that the process ∆zt is stationary, zt
is nonstationary, but β’zt is stationary.
In our specific case, according to equation 8, zt is a 3x1
vector formed by the variables Kf, A and g, while Dt are
intervention dummies δi and λi that control for changes in
the regulations on foreign borrowing and for supply shocks
such as the tequila, Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises,
respectively.
In order to understand the interpretation of the model, it
is useful to expand some terms. Assuming, for simplicity’s
sake, that there are no deterministic components and that there
is only one cointegration vector (i.e., r = 1), we can write:
α1 Kf α1
Πzt–1 = α2 [β1 β2 β3] A = α2 [β1Kf + β2A + β3g]t–1
α3 g α3
and, therefore, rewrite the full system as:
∆Kft ∆Kft–1 α1 Kf ε1t
[A.3] ∆At = Γ1 ∆At–1 + α2 [β1 β2 β3] A + ε2t
∆gt ∆gt–1 α3 g t–1 ε3t
In general, it is useful to normalize the cointegration
vector by the variable of interest, which in our case is private
capital flows, Kf. This is done simply by multiplying the β
vector by 1/β1. For that reason, ∆Kft, the equation of interest,
can be written in the error correction form described by
equation A.2:
[A.4] ∆Kft = Γ11∆Kft–1 + Γ12∆At–1 + Γ13∆gt–1
β2 β3+ α~1   Kft–1 + At–1 + gt–1    + εtβ1 β1
where α~1 α1β1.
The cointegration relation A.4 (equation 9 in the text) is
a stationary series, which is interpreted as a long-run
equilibrium relation between the three variables Kf, A and g.
If  β’zt–1 ≠ 0, then it is interpreted as a long-run equilibrium
error. On the other hand, α~1, which is called the loading,
measures the average speed of adjustment or convergence
towards long-run equilibrium.
This analytical framework makes it possible to test
whether a variable is weakly exogenous. For instance, the
variable representing imports of capital goods, g, is said to
be weakly exogenous for β if α3 = 0 (see equation A.3), and
therefore implies that the equation ∆gt does not contain
information about the long-run parameters β. In general, it is
advantageous to condition the model on weakly exogenous
variables as a means of improving the stochastic properties
of the model. Furthermore, it is likely that the rest of the
system will perform better statistically (see Hansen and
Juselius, 1995; Enders, 1995; Harris, 1995).
Tests used
The test for the constancy of β is a test of the hypothesis
[A.5] Hβτ: β
~
 ∈ sp (βτ)       τ = T0,…,T.
where β~ is a known matrix. In our case, β~ is the cointegration
vector estimated in equations 3 and 6 of table 4.
The test statistic is given by:




[A.6] τ = T0,…,T.




~= 0     τ = T0,…,T.
and λˆi(τ) are the r largest eigenvalues in the unrestricted
eigenvalue problem:
[A.8] λSkk(τ)–Sk0(τ)S-100 (τ)S01(τ)= 0        τ = T0,…,T.
The test statistic (A.6) is asymptotically distributed as
χ2 with (dk-r)r degrees of freedom (Hansen and Juselius,
1995). In our case, dk=5 (3 variables, a constant and the row
for the determinist variables) and r = 1 (the number of
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